Germany's Own Starlink Bid

Rheinmetall and OHB in early talks to build a military LEO network

Today sources told the Financial Times that Rheinmetall, Germany's large defence manufacturer, and OHB, a Bremen-based satellite builder, have opened discussions about a joint bid to create a Starlink-style, low Earth orbit (LEO) communications service for the Bundeswehr. The venture would seek part of a €35 billion German programme devoted to military space capabilities and is being positioned by officials as a secure, sovereign alternative to commercial providers such as SpaceX’s Starlink.

A Bundeswehr LEO constellation

The proposed project is aimed at delivering resilient, military-grade broadband for battlefield and rear-area communications from LEO—the crowded orbital band roughly up to 2,000 kilometres above Earth where megaconstellations operate. Starlink's commercial system, with more than 9,000 satellites in orbit, demonstrated how quickly portable terminals and high-throughput LEO links can support front-line forces: those lessons informed Germany's decision to invest heavily in military space.

German military planners have finished drafting specifications for the network and procurement officials are preparing a tender, according to people familiar with the process. Armin Fleischmann, a space co-ordinator inside the Bundeswehr, has said the intention is to build the capability "over the next few years, primarily with German companies," with an initial focus on NATO's eastern flank—notably supporting a new 5,000-strong German brigade deployed in Lithuania.

Industrial logic and shifting business models

Rheinmetall is best known for tanks and munitions but has aggressively diversified as Germany's defence spending rose. Late last year the company won a contract, worth of order-of-magnitude euros, to partner with Finnish radar-satellite maker Iceye to manufacture radar reconnaissance satellites in Germany, signalling a rapid move into space systems production and operations. OHB, Europe's third-largest satellite builder and a supplier to the Galileo navigation constellation, sees the project as an opportunity to scale up small- and medium-satellite manufacturing.

The discussions come as Europe’s space industrial landscape is shifting: consolidation pressures have risen after proposals to combine the space divisions of Airbus, Thales and Leonardo, which OHB's chief executive Marco Fuchs has warned could be anti-competitive. A German-led military LEO programme would create fresh domestic demand and could help smaller suppliers stay competitive amid consolidation.

Security, sovereignty and the Starshield precedent

Starlink began as a commercial service but its terminals and LEO topology proved invaluable to Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion, prompting SpaceX to create Starshield, a defence-tailored offering. Many European governments now face a trade-off: accept commercial foreign platforms for expediency, or fund sovereign systems to reduce strategic dependence on non-EU suppliers.

German officials have argued the new network must be "sovereign": under national control, hardened against jamming and cyberattacks, and operated within national security frameworks. That implies not just satellites but secure ground stations, protected user terminals, encryption and integration with military command-and-control. Those capabilities are technically demanding and costly; they also require a long-term logistics and sustainment plan.

Technical scale and choices

There is no public blueprint yet for how many satellites or what exact architecture a Bundeswehr network would use. A true Starlink-style civilian megaconstellation entails thousands of satellites and very high upfront capital costs. A sovereign military system may instead prioritise a smaller fleet of specialised satellites with robust anti-jam features, dedicated ground stations, and interoperable terminals designed for tactical use.

Industry players talk about a layered approach: resilient LEO links for tactical connectivity, medium Earth orbit (MEO) or geostationary assets for long-haul backbone, and optical or microwave crosslinks to improve capacity and latency. Integrating radar reconnaissance satellites (like those Rheinmetall and Iceye plan to build) with comms satellites can create a combined ISR-communications architecture, improving situational awareness for deployed units.

Costs, timelines and procurement realities

Berlin's €35bn commitment to military space will make Germany one of the world's largest spenders on space after the US and China, according to the consultancy Novaspace. But translating political pledges into operational capability takes time: design, manufacturing, launch cadence, certification for military use, procurement rules and export controls all add complexity. The government has drawn up specifications, but awarding and executing a multibillion-euro contract will be a multi-year effort.

For suppliers, the prize is substantial. Officials in industry and government have framed the programme as a way to bolster NATO deterrence on Europe's eastern flank and to ensure communications resilience without depending on foreign commercial suppliers whose corporate decisions may not align with national strategic needs.

Competition and the European picture

Rheinmetall and OHB are not the only potential contenders. European defence and aerospace firms are already positioning to win work when tenders are issued. At the same time, the prospect of a larger consolidated industrial champion comprising Airbus, Thales and Leonardo would reshape competition and may complicate procurement choices for Berlin.

OHB's leadership has publicly warned that consolidation among the giants could limit competition; teaming with a large defence prime such as Rheinmetall is one way for the smaller satellite manufacturer to secure scale and a place in a German sovereign programme.

Operational risks and broader implications

A sovereign LEO comms network would reduce dependency on non-European providers, but it creates its own risks. Satellites operate in contested space: they are vulnerable to jamming, cyber intrusion, and anti-satellite measures. Any German programme will need to consider redundancy, rapid replenishment (spare satellites and on-orbit servicing plans), and legal frameworks for use in coalition operations with NATO partners that may rely on commercial systems today.

The diplomatic benefits are also clear: a national capability strengthens Germany’s hand in NATO planning and gives Berlin more control over the dissemination of sensitive data. Yet some allies and private sector advocates argue that leveraging commercial services can be faster and more cost-effective; the German plan signals a political choice to prioritise sovereignty and control.

Next steps

The talks between Rheinmetall and OHB are in early stages and the defence ministry, procurement agency and the companies have declined to comment publicly. If a joint bid is assembled it will compete for a tranche of the €35bn envelope when formal tenders are issued. Timelines cited by defence officials suggest work will begin within a few years, but full operational capability will take longer, depending on architecture choices and launch schedules.

Whether Germany builds a compact sovereign constellation, leans on alliances and commercial partners, or pursues a hybrid model will have implications for European industrial strategy, transatlantic relations, and how future wars are fought in the electromagnetic and cyber domains.

Sources

• German Federal Ministry of Defence (Bundeswehr procurement and space coordination)
• Rheinmetall AG (defence group)
• OHB SE (satellite manufacturer)
• Novaspace (space consultancy)
• ICEYE (radar-satellite partner)